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Law & TechnologyLaw and TechnologyThis week's acronym: CAPPSBy Linda AckermanMay 23, 2002 -- CAPPS, the "Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening" system, profiles airline passengers based on secret criteria in order to identify potential terrorists. A new version is being prototyped (CAPPS2), which dramatically extends the existing screening. Of course, we all want to feel comfortable knowing that when we board a plane that we will make it to our destination safe and sound. Before embracing this proposal, though, it's worth asking some important questions: will it work? What are the consequences to society? Is it constitutional? I tend to believe that there are a number of issues to be resolved before moving ahead.CAPPS and CAPPS2 CAPPS profiles today are constructed based on secret criteria, scoring airline passengers on a "threat" index based on their travel history and 26 additional variables. Only passengers with checked baggage are currently screened. CAPPS2 goes much further than the original version. This new version will screen all passengers, at the time they purchase a ticket--that is, generally prior to arriving at the airport. Those rated as a threat will presumably be taken aside at check-in. Screening data will include not only travel history, but more than 1,000 details of personal information about you that "experts" believe will determine how much of a risk you represent. This information will be provided directly by passengers--and other sources as well. Washington Post reporter Robert O'Harrow, Jr. reported that the prototype system is being developed in partnership with two giant data brokers, Acxiom and Equifax. Data brokers collect information about you from public records, from the trails you leave as a consumer, and from warranty cards, and sweepstakes entry forms. Much of this information is inaccurate or outdated--and unlike your credit report, which the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) allows you to see and correct, data broker information is unregulated. Since we can't see the information, there's no way to know for sure how accurate it is; but it would be surprising if it were much more than 50 percent accurate. A 1998 study by USPIRG (U.S. Public Interest Research Group) found that credit report information (which is regulated, and subject to review) has a 30 percent rate of serious errors; data broker information comes from more suspect sources and isn't reviewed, so the accuracy is probably much lower. Does CAPPS work? Nobody knows how well CAPPS works today; the profiles and results are secret, so it's not possible for independent analysts to judge. CAPPS2 will involve substantially more information--but information of lower quality. Does this make it more or less likely to work effectively? Once again, nobody knows; and it's impossible to have a real discussion in the absence of information. Consequences of CAPPS One obvious unpleasant consequence of CAPPS occurs to people who are incorrectly identified as terrorists--based on incorrect information in the system or simply bugs in the program. A story in the May 9 New Yorker describes the travails of a 70-year-old woman whose name happened to approximate one of the aliases of a murderer who had recently been arrested in Mexico--and is now on the "Master Terrorist" list. A quick visit to the ACLU Web site will show you many horror stories of people who were mistakenly identified as terrorists based on profiles. It could happen to you, too: for example, if the information tied to your Social Security number happens to be wrong, through identity theft or by accident. Or say that you're a regular business traveler between Seattle and San Francisco, who takes the same flights, sees many of the same passengers, and talks to them casually. Drawing on similar travel records and a variety of other information, CAPPS could find suspicious links between you and people you don't even know, just because your profiles show similar behavior patterns. Even if the information is accurate, the consequences may still be onerous to some. There was a recent story about a group of high school students who were made to miss their flight to a peaceful protest in DC because their names showed up on a "no fly" list. The students were grilled for several hours causing them to miss their flight--and the protest. They were effectively barred from participating in a lawful democratic process, apparently based on a compilation of their political activities. The take home message: Be careful who you associate with, or you may be denied a seat on a plane. During the 1950s and 1960s the government used political affiliations against citizens. There is little doubt that this will be the case with information collected by the government under the guise of protecting everyone from terrorists. Constitutionality of CAPPS As background, let's look at the Fourth Amendment and how it applies to airline searches. The Fourth amendment states that we have a right to be secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is a warrant requirement and the places that will be searched and the persons or things that will be seized need to be particularly described. When you go through the metal detectors at an airport, that is a search under the Fourth Amendment. However, even though there is no warrant, it is one that the courts have deemed acceptable because it is done to everyone, and is not intrusive, among other things. There has been very little litigation as to whether CAPPS violates the Fourth Amendment. Civil libertarians view even the original version of CAPPS as crossing the line, and CAPPS 2 goes much further. Key questions are the intrusiveness (both of the CAPPS system itself, and of the processes put in place around it) and potential for discrimination. Once again, since the profiles are secret, there is no way to check to make sure that the profiles are not constructed in a discriminatory manner. Conclusion Going back to the original question, is profiling the way to increase security for the airlines? I think it is difficult to know, particularly since almost no information is coming out of the agencies responsible for administering the program. What I do think needs to be examined are the societal and personal privacy costs--costs that could dramatically change our society for the worse. Linda Ackerman is a privacy advocate and staff counsel with Privacyactivism.org. 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